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l\:ATL.:RE CF THE CASE

The case involves the tender by the respondents (plaintiffs,
counte..--jefen::lants) of ~e Jud;iment 0f $62, 557. 96, awarded to .:he
aopella'lt, ::lefen:Jant, counter-clairna.'ltAugust 1, 1977, whichtenjer was maje to jefendant and his counsel at an execution foreclosure sale noticed by the defendant t::> sell 10,000 shares of stock
01Nne:1 by respo.'l::le.'lts in the Finlinsan-Oder Corporati:::in, which
stock represe.rite::l respQndents' :::ine-half interest in 600 acres Qf
'.and being purcrased oy Finlins::>n-Dder Corporation.
The appellant was intent upcri the foreclosure because resp::>ndents property was valued at at least $30,000 in excess of the
a'Tlo.._.,t of the ..Judgment, a'1d the sale on execution would have resulted, had the responde'"lts not tendered the mO'"ley, in an enrich,,ent
to the appellant of an additional $30,000 above the Judgment.
The respondents, in order to avoid the sale of the stock and
the forecl::>sure of their interest in the real property, paid the judgment to the appellant and when appellant delivered it back stating he
intended to appeal, respondents kept the tender ope'l and Q3-:xl during the appellate period, wherein the appellant attempted to increase
the amount of his

~ujgrr.ent

on claims of increased invent'.)ry, in-

•,
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denied in upholding the trial courts decision.

And the trial court,

after the Remittitur was filed, held that there had been valid, unconditional tender continuing during the appellate period.

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT

The District Court upon entry of Remittitur from the
Supreme Court upholding a Judgment of $62, 557. 96 from responden ts, entered an Order and Judgment denying interest since tender
of the Judgment payment, August 11, 1977 and staying execution
and sale of respondents' one-half interest in farming property
which stock was valued at $90,000, and which stock appellant had
held as pledge ar'\d security for payment of the Judgment.
The respondents had tendered to the Clerk of the District
Court, following the entry of the Remittitur June 5, 1979, cashierls
check for the payment of the Judgment in the sum of $62,557.96.
The said Judgment appealed from herein, dated August 22, 1979,
held the tender of payment of the Judgment of August 1, 1977 was
full, complete, unconditional and remained good, thus being a bar
to additional interest after tender.
The Judgment of August 22, 1979 further provided For a stay
of execution of sale of respondents' corporate stock for payment of
•
.
A
. -t 11 1977
$9, 724. 05 interest s1nce the tender by respondents on ug~"
'

2.
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at which ti.me >''Sspo:-idents delivered two cashier's checks to the
appellant in t:1e total amount of the Judgment and costs which the
Court held was a full and unconditional tender.

And th3.t it was a

continuing tender with the funds available for payment, and the
respondents were absolved from the payment of interest after sai.d
tender, arid th3.t the $9, 724. 05 requested by the appellant as addi.ti.onal interest after tender was di.sallowed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The plaintiffs and respondents seek affirmation of the
Judgment of the Di.strict Court.

STATE'MENT OF FACTS

The plai.nti.ffs and the defendants since 1973, were each
owners of o.-i e-h3.lf of the stock of the Fi.nli.ns:m-Oder Corporation.
The only assets of the corporation was a contract to purchase the
Callister land and water for approximately $90,000, now valued
at $300, 000.
Bur;ii.s Fi.nli.nson and Lyle Oder had previously engaged i.n
a dairy heifer Feeding program where Finli.nson furnished the
labor and Oder the capital.

Fi.nlins:>n bec3.me indebted to Oder for

3.
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adva.,ces and expenses, and Burn is Finl ins on and Melva Finl inson
pledged their stock in Finlinson-Oder Corporation as security for
said advances.

Defendant Oder was renting the corporation's

property (Callister), and using it in the feeding venture.
When the parties fell out of favor in both the corporation and
feeding venture, litigation insued in which the Court entered the
Judgme'1t on August 1, 1977 of $62, 557. 96, for respondents. The
Judgment was secured by the pledge of plaintiffs' corporate stock.
Because of accretion and more especially because some of the
neighbors had produced fantastic potato crops at great profit, the
value of the pledged property increased to three ti.mes its purchase
value.

Defendant immediately filed execution on his Judgment and

Notice of Sale on the pledged stock and set August 11, 1977 as the
date of sheriff's sale to sell plaintiffs stock.

Plaintiffs and their

attorney showed up at the sale with two cashier's checks and delivered them to the defendant in satisfaction of the Judgment. The
defendant and his counsel received the checks, acknowledged the
sufficiency of the amount with no condition, except of course, the
Judgment would be sati.sfei.d.

The defendant with the sale of the

property thwarted, returned the money to plaintiffs and stated they
elected to appeal in an attempt to increase the amount of the Judgment (and keep the plaintiffs from redeeming their pledged property.)

4.
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The respondents advised the defendant and the sheriff and the
Clerk of the Court that the offer was continuing (Tr. Oct. 3,
1979, page 4, line 26; page 5, line 15 - 17) The defendant retained the pledged stock, which was readily saleable for at least
$20,000 in excess of the appeal demarids of defendant.

The stock

or its value in money could have been left with the Clerk of the
Court which would have fully secured the Judgment, both as to
its sum as tendered or to any increase on appeal.

But defendant

retained it in his personal possession and plaintiffs were denied its
use.
On June 5, 1979 the Supreme Court upheld the Judgment
of the District Court in all its respects with costs to the Plaintiffs.
And when the Remittitur came down to the Di.strict Court the respondents, plaintiffs again tendered to the defendant, the amount of
the Judgment.
The defendant again ordered an execution and Notice of Sale
of plaintiffs' pledged stock which would have meant the loss of the
plaintiffs' one-half of the farm property.

Defendant now requested

$9, 775. 00 as additional interest since August 11 , 1977.
Plaintiffs filed action to stay execution and delivered $62,557.96
to the Clerk of the Court and asked for a Satisfaction of Judgment.
The defendant received his $62, 557 .96, and this time retained it

5.
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on June 11, 1979, and still retains the plaintiffs' 10,000shares

of Finlinson-Oder Corporation stock with its

value for sale or s~'.-1

urity of more than $90, 000.

I
i

G.
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I

ARGUMENT

FOINT I: THE ACTUAL TENDER INTC THE HANDS
OF THE APPEL LANT OF $62, 557. 96 ON AUGUST 11 , 1977
WAS AND IS AN UNCONDITIONAL OFFER AND DID CONSTITUTE
DELIVERY OF LEGAL TENDER TERMINATING THE INTEREST
FROVISION OF THE JUDGMENT.
Cf specific concern in this case is the fact that the defendarit, appellant herein, Lyle Oder, was attempting and did attempt
from the inception of the action to render it difficult or impossible
for the plaintiff to make performance on the contract so that he
could take advantage of the nonperformance and obtain the plaintiffs'
pl edged stock in the Finlinson-Oder Corporation, which would have
delivered to the defendant should he be aole to refuse the tender,
the plaintiffs' equity in the farm land reasonably valued at $100, 000.
So when on P..ugust 11 , 1977, in response to Notice of Sale under
forec'iosure of the plaintiffs' shares of stock which would have given
the buyer all the ownership in the land, the plaintiffs came prepared
to the sale a"1d actually delivered into the possession of the defendant, two cashier's checks for the total amol.l"lt of the Judgment of
$62, 557. 96, t::>gether with costs.
The defendant doesnot deny the actual tender and receiving
of possession, nor does he deny delivering the payment back to the
7.
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plaintiffs, refusing to accept it, stating he was going to appeal
the Judgment which he had thus executed upon, to the Supreme
Court.
The sole and obvious reason was to make it more difficult or impossible for the plaintiffs to pay or perform under the
Judgment.

And the defendant was attempting to take advantage

of the nonperformance which he, the defendant had caused.
The Supreme Court has spoken definitely on this matter,
wherein the case of Zions Property, Inc. vs. Forrest C. Holt,
538 Pac. 2d 1319, the following quotation is given.
"There is implied in any contract, a covena'lt
of good faith and cooperation which should prevent
either party from impeding the other's performance of his obligations under the contract, and one
party may not render it difficult or impossible for
the other party to continue performance and then
take advantage of the nonperformance he has caused. 11
Under the provisions of the R=quisites and Sufficiency of
Tender, 7 4 Am Jur 2d, Section 7, it is stated:
"Tender imp! ies the physical act of offering the
money or thing to be tendered, but this ca'lnot rest
in implication alone. The law requires an actual
present, physical offer; it is not satisfied by a mere
spoken offer to pay. It is the general rule that the
money must be actually shown to the person to whom
it is tendered. "

Plaintiffs met these requirements and the sufficiency of
the amount is not questioned.

When the actual cashier's checks
8.
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for the full amount of the Judgment was del'iv£red back to the
Flaintiffs by tre dsfendant after it was tenderE:d at the sheriff's
sale and executio:1 of the sale stopped by the defendant, the
plaintiffs stated that there was a continuing offer and tender of
the payment, and from that moment on the defendant had in his
personal possession $90, 000 worth of Finl ins on-Oder Corporation stock owned by the plaintiffs, and the assurance that the
money represented by the cashier's checks was at all times
available.
There was no condition placed upon the tender, except
that the Judgment became automatically satisfied a'1d the pledged
stock would normally and automatically be surrendered to the
pledgor.
The tender from August 11 , 1977 was kept good and was
at all ti.mes ready for the creditors acceptanc2, and there was
never any time when the defendant could not have and didnot
always have the r~ady payment of the Judgment claimed as well as
the security for the full payment.
The District Court in its findings and Judgment after being
fully aware o" all of the ctrcumsta'1ces in this matter, held that
there had been unconditional and complete tender of the Judgment
and that the tender had been kept good and that the same did stop

9.
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interest on the tendered amount.
The Court's position is upheld by the substantive law
which is stated in 74 Am. Jur. 2d, 31:
"The rule is one of natural justice. A debtor is
released from the payment of interest on the supposition that he has been deprived of the use of the
money by holding himself in readiness all the time
to pay his creditor on the demand of the latter."
Replying to the statements of the appellant in his brief,
wherein he states,

"That on August 11, 1977, defendant Oder

had the right to be paid by Finlinson the $62 ,557. 96 ::ir he had
the right to appeal to the Supreme Court."

He elected to exe-

cute o:i his Judgment and filed Notice of Sheriff's sale.

When

the payment was fully and unconditionally tendered him, then
he elected to appeal to make it difficult for the plaintiffs to
satisfy his Judgment, arid receive back the security of his
pledged stock, the loss of which amounted to the plaintiffs being
required to keep good and be without the benefit of $100, 000 worth
of collateral which was needed for his own purpose, during the
appeal period.
The certificates of stock could have been placed with the
Clerk of the Court or in escrow, and the defendant would h=i.ve
at all times had the security of his Judgment, but he kept the
stock in his own possession which aff::irded him the same security
10.
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and at all times after August 11, 1977, the defendant had not
only $90, 000 worth of stock certificate..s belonging to the
plaintiffs, but also had the complete tender of performance
as delivered to defendant in cashier's checks for the amount
of the Judgment, which the Court found was kept good and continuing.
The case of Cole vs. Cole, 101 Utah 355, 122 P2, 201
as cited for authority by the appellant, is distinguished from
the instant case as it was also distinguishable in the case of
Sieverts vs. White 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P2 974, wherein it was
stated that Cole vs. Cole was possibly of questionable authority
upon the points of accepta'!ce by the payee of a check as payment
of the obligation so that the accrual of interest upon the account
thus sought to be paid, is stopped, but stated:
"The case is persuasive to the conclusion that
a check is not a tender for the purpose of satisfying an obligation unless there are sufficient funds
in the account of the drawor in the depository
upon which it is drawn for payment in full upon its
purchase in due course."
In that case the check h3.d been paid to the Clerk of the
Court and by him, transmitted b counsel for the claimant but
were not presented for payment.

Sometime later the maker

notified counsel fo:"' the claimant that he had aopli.ed the mo1ey
originally on deposit to cover the checks to other uses.
11.
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In the instant case the respondents kept the amount available for payment of the Judgment and the appellant kept $90,080
of the respondents' as security for such payment.
It was with the thought of such sufficiency of tender that
the Supreme Court in the case of Thomas vs. Johnson, 55 Utah
424, 186 P 437, stated:
"The law never compels a person to do that
which is vain or useless."
For the respondents to have done more would h3.ve been vain or
useless.

POINT II.

A VALID SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

TENDER WAS MADE AUGUST 11, 1977 AND REMAINED GOOD
AND CONTINUING.
In a similar case the Supreme Court of Utah in Hansen vs.
Christensen (1976), 545 P2 1152, found that on October 31, 1962
plaintiff went to the home of defendant and offered to make full
payment.

Defendant refused payment, informed the plaintiff he

was i.n default and she was repossessing the land.

The next day

plaintiff left a cashier's check with First Security Bank in
Brigham City.

The Court in that case, found a 'present physical

offer to pay was refused by the seller and the buyer ::Hd the next
12.
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thing, vix, to place on deposit to the seller's order, a cashier's
check in the i:ota.l amount due under the contra::t. The Court
ruling stated:
"Where the unreasonable conduct of the obligee
would make an actual tender a fruitless gesture,
an offer to comply with the terms of the contract
by the obl igor is sufficient."
In the instant case the Court

fo~nd

respondents Finli.nsons

delivered two cashier's checks for tho· full amount of the Judgment
into the hands of the appellant at a place a'1d a time (appellant's
execution sale on August 11, 1977 at 10 a.m.), and defendant ackknowledged the sufficiency of the tendered amount.

But the defend-

ant refused it and put the checks back in the hands of the responden ts, who then told both defendant arid the sheriff that the tender
was continuing and good (Tr. Q 4-330) and at all times thereafter
the tender was good.

And the appellant retained in his own posses-

sion, $90, 000 in stock certificates of respondents which he had
hoped to sell on execution in satisfaction of his Judgment of

$62,557.96.
As in the case of Zion's Properties, Inc. vs. Holt, supra
one party may not render it difficult or impossible for the other
party to perform and then take advantage of the claimed nonperforma'1ce.

13.
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In the instant case, as soon as the District Court Judgment
had been affirmed by the Supreme Court and the Remittitur filed
June 11 , 1979, the respondents again placed the full $62, 557. 96
in the hands of the defendant who has now retained it, but asks
interest after the refused tender while he retained $90,000 of
respondents' certificates for which respondents lost the security
value of and at the same time the respondents kept an active account
to pay appellant at any minute he requested which he did on June 11,

1979.
It was only the unreasonable conduct of the appellant in refusing the actual tender which has prevented the payment a11d the
Court has found the obligor's tender sufficient in the following
cases:

Thomas vs. Johnson, 55 Utah 242, 186 F. 437 (1919);

E'vans vs. Houtz, 57 Utah 216, 193 P 858 (1950); Hansen vs.
Christensen, 545 P2 1152 ( 1976).

14.
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I

1

POINT III.

IHE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT ARE
ENTITLED TO THE TRADITIONAL RULE OF THE APFELLATE
COURT VIEWING THE EVIDENCE, AND ALL INFERENCES
THAT CAN RfASONABL Y BE DRAWN THERfFROM IN THE
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE" FINDINGS MADE AND THE
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE TRIAL COURT.

Cutler vs.

Bowen, Utah 1975, 543, P2 1349; and Hardy vs. Hendrickson,
27 Utah 251 , 495 P2 28, and Oberhansley vs. Don B. Earl, et al,
1977, Utah 572 P2 1384.
In the above cases the Court found on appeal the decision
of the trial court is entitled to a presumption of validity, and all
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated August 22, 1979, (Tr. Q 4-330, paragraph 5,
line 11), that the plaintiffs tendered to the defendant and his legal
counsel, cashier's checks drawn on the First Security Bank of
Utah in the sum of said Judgment of $62,557 .96, plus any costs
or expenses or interest involved in the sale, and that the defendant and his counsel after conferring with each other, delivered
the tendered payment, which the parties stipulated was the full
15.
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amount of principal, interest and costs, back to the plaintiffs.
(Tr. Court proceedings, October 3, 1979, page 4, line 26 - 30;
page 5, line 1 - 30.)
The Court further found in paragraph 6, line 20, that
there were no conditions or restrictions imposed upon the payment received and had by the defendant which defendant returned to plaintiffs, except the return of the pledged stock of the
Finl inson-Oder Corporation, (which was automatic with the
satisfaction of the Judgment.)
The Court further found in Finding Number 8, l i.ne 27,
that from the date of the Judgment through the proceedings in the
Supreme Court and the Remittitur upholding the decisions of the
trial court, that the defendant retained possessio., of the 10,000
shares of the Finl inson-Oder stock, which stock based upon the
testimony of the defendant, had a reasonable value of $90,000
to $100,000.
The Court further found i.n Finding 14, that the delivery
by the plaintiffs to the defendant of $62, 557. 96 on August 11,
1977, which was returned by the defendant to the plaintiffs, was
equivalent to the actual payment to bar interest and was bona
fide tender, relieving and absolving the plaintiffs of further interest.
The Cour':

r.e\~ 1,-,

Finding 15, line 2c, that

the i".v'J

16.
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neve"

-compels the individual to do that which was vain and useless,
arid that it would be vain and useless to have frozen the said
payment after defendant refused and returned it on August 11,
1977.
The Court had, from 5eptember 18, 1974 through
August of 1979, engaged in eleven days of trials and hearings,
where the circumstances and the details relating to the sai.d amount of the claim, the tender, the suffi.ci.ency thereof, and the
two actual deliveries of payment were refused by him first hand,
and the appells.te court i.s required to view th::, evidence and any
inference dra·M1 therefor, i.n the light m:::>st favorable to sustain the deci.si.on.

Cutler vs. Bown, 543, P2 '394.

17.
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I
CONCLUSIONS

The judgment of the Di.strict Court is Fully sustained by
the evidence, by the circumstances and is in accordance with
the law relating to tender of performance.

The tender was kept

unco:idi.ttonal, good and remained good, and only the unreasonable conduct of the obi i.gatee in attempting to avoid arid delay the
acceptance of payment with the hope that he could eventually foreclose the plaintiffs' equity in the real property kept the defendarit
from having the full amount of the tnedered .Judgment and it was
available to him any day that he would accept it through the appellate procedure and to the date that he did finally accept it followi.ng the Remittitur on .June 11 , 1979.

And the tender for the

.Judgment was found by the Court to continue from tender to date of
acceptance .
DATED this 6 "'J {' day of .January, A. D. , 1980.

r-/

~

"

____::::::,,....._
/--"" ( ' ,
(,
. (
,.-- -··c::: •
_'/:----fr:(;.-.,, r: '- r / - (!,;I
~DON A. ELIASON-

(
'------ --

Attorney for Plaintiffs
And Respondents
22 North 300 West
Delta, Utah 84624
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